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EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS -
EXTRADITION - INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, SOERING
CASE, 161 EUR. CT. H.R. (SER. A) (1989)
I. FACTS
Jens Soering is a German national born on August 1, 1966.1 Soering
and his girlfriend, Elizabeth Haysom, a Canadian national, were both
honor students at the University of Virginia when her parents died
at their Bedford County, Virginia home in March 1985.2 The parents
died from multiple and massive stab and slash wounds to the neck,
throat, and body.' In an interview with an investigator from the
Sheriff's Department of Bedford County, Soering stated that he loved
his girlfriend, but that her parents disapproved of the relationship.'
Therefore, he and Ms. Haysom planned to kill her parents. They
drove to Washington, D.C. and established an alibi. Soering then
drove to the parents' home and discussed with them his relationship
with their daughter. Soering stated that When the parents told him
that they would do anything to obstruct the relationship, a quarrel
developed and he stabbed them with a knife.'
I Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 11. Soering was born in
West Germany. His father was a West German diplomat who was working in Detroit
in 1985. See Human Rights Court Bars American "Death Row" Justice, The Reuter
File Rep. (AM Cycle), July 7, 1989 (NEXIS, Omni file).
2 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 12.
Id. Details of the Haysom family and its relationships with Soering, the murders
of Derek and Nancy Haysom, and the search for their killers are told in K. ENGLADE,
BEYOND REASON (1990).
4 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 13. The investigator from
the Bedford County Sheriff's Department swore an affidavit on July 24, 1986, which
stated that Soering admitted the killings in the presence of the investigator and two
United Kingdom police officers. Id. The European Court of Human Rights presumed
that Soering admitted killing the Haysoms. It is unclear, however, whether Soering
actually stated that he killed the Haysoms. See Soering Evidence Hearing Concludes,
United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Mar. 5, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). Soering's attorney, during the
trial of Soering's murder charges in Bedford County, argued during a motion to
GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L. [Vol. 20:461
Soering and Ms. Haysom disappeared from Virginia in October
1985. English police arrested them in April 1986 on charges of check
fraud. 6 The couple was convicted on the check fraud charges and
began serving sentences in England. On June 13, 1986, a grand jury
of the Circuit Court of Bedford County indicted Soering on charges
of murdering Ms. Haysom's parents. 7 On August 11, 1986, the United
States Government requested the extradition of Soering and Ms. Hay-
som to the United States.' On October 29, 1986, the British Embassy
in Washington, D.C. requested that the United States Government
guarantee that, if the United Kingdom surrendered Soering and if he
were convicted of the crimes for which he had been indicted, the
death penalty, if imposed, would not be carried out.9
suppress the admission of the taped interviews into evidence that Soering made the
incriminating statements only because his requests for an attorney were denied. Soering
also alleged that an English police sergeant made veiled threats to harm Ms. Haysom.
See Soering Evidence Hearing Concludes, United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Mar. 5,
1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
6 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
Id. Soering was serving his sentence at Her Majesty's Prison, Chelmsford,
England. The Bedford County grand jury charged Soering with the capital murder
of both parents and the separate non-capital murders of each of them. The Virginia
Code provides that eight types of homicide constitute capital murder, punishable as
a class 1 felony, including "the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of more
than one person as part of the same act or transaction." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
31(g) (1950). The punishment for a class 1 felony is "death or imprisonment for
life." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a) (1950).
1 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). The extradition arrangements
between the United Kingdom and the United States are governed by the Extradition
Treaty signed by the two governments on June 8, 1972, a Supplementary Treaty
signed on June 25, 1982, and an Exchange of Notes dated August 19 and 20, 1986,
amending the Supplementary Treaty. These arrangements have been incorporated into
the law of the United Kingdom by Orders in Council (the United States of America
(Extradition) Order 1976, S.I. 1976/2144 and the United States of America (Extra-
dition) (Amendment) Order 1986, S.I. 1986/2020). Id. at 31. Article I of the
Extradition Treaty provides:
Each Contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other, in the circum-
stances and subject to any offence [specified in the Treaty and including
murder], committed within the jurisdiction of the other Party.
Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, United States - United Kingdom, 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468, art. I. On May 8, 1987, Ms. Haysom was surrendered
for extradition to the United States. She pled guilty on August 6, 1987, to an indictment
of being an accessory to the murder of her parents and was sentenced on October
6, 1987, to 90 years imprisonment (45 years on each count of murder). See Soering
Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 18.
9 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 15. The request was in
these terms:
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English police arrested Soering a second time on December 30, 1986,
after he served his sentence for check fraud. This arrest was pursuant
to the terms of the English Extradition Act of 1870.10 The District
Attorney for Bedford County swore an affidavit dated June 1, 1987,
which certified that should Soering be convicted of capital murder,
the prosecutor would make, on behalf of the United Kingdom, a
representation to the judge at the time of sentencing that the death
penalty not be carried out." On June 16, 1987, committal proceedings
2
for Soering's extradition to the United States were held pursuant to
the terms of the Extradition Act of 1870.1 A magistrate committed
Because the death penalty has been abolished in Great Britain, the Embassy
[of the United Kingdom] has been instructed to seek an assurance, in
accordance with the terms of . . .the Extradition Treaty, that, in the event
of [Soering] being surrendered and being convicted of the crimes for which
he has been indicted . . ., the death penalty, if imposed, will not be carried
out.
10 Id. Section 7 of the Extradition Act 1870 provides in relevant part: "A requisition
for the surrender of a fugitive criminal of any foreign state, who is in or suspected
of being in the United Kingdom, shall be made to a Secretary of State by some
person recognised by the Secretary of State as a diplomatic representative of that
foreign state." Extradition Act 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, § 7. Section 8 provides
in relevant part:
A warrant for the apprehension of a fugitive criminal, whether accused or
convicted of crime, who is in or suspected of being in the United Kingdom,
may be issued (1) by a police magistrate on the receipt of the said order
of the Secretary of State, and on such evidence as would in his opinion
justify the issue of the warrant if the crime had been committed in England.
Id. at § 8.
1 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 20. The affidavit was
transmitted to the United Kingdom Government under cover of a diplomatic note
on June 8, 1987. A similar assurance was contained in an affidavit sworn on February
16, 1988, and transmitted to the United Kingdom Government under cover of a
diplomatic note on May 17, 1988.
12 Id. at 1 21. Extradition proceedings in the United Kingdom consist of an
extradition hearing before a magistrate. Section 10 of the Extradition Act 1870 provides
that if:
[S]uch evidence is produced as (subject to the provisions of this Act) would,
according to the law of England, justify the committal for trial of the
prisoner if the crime of which he is accused had been committed in England
... the . . .magistrate shall commit him to prison but otherwise he shall
order him to be discharged.
A magistrate must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on
trial; before committing him a prima facie case must be made out against him. "The
test is whether, if the evidence before the Magistrate stood at the trial, a reasonable
jury properly directed could accept it and find a verdict of guilty" (Schtr.aks v. Gov't
of Israel, [1964] Appeal Cases 556). Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)
at 32.
11 Id. at 6. The committal proceedings took place at Bow Street Magistrates'
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Soering to await an order for his return to the United States from
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. 4
Soering commenced legal proceedings in the United Kingdom on
June 29, 1987, in an effort to block his extradition to the United
States. 5 The Queen's Bench Divisional Court refused his applications
for a writ of habeas corpus in respect of his committal and for leave
to apply for judicial review on December 11, 1987.16 The House of
Lords on June 30, 1988, rejected his petition for leave to appeal
against the decision of the Divisional Court.' 7 Soering then petitioned
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs on July 14, 1988, to exercise
his discretion under section 11 of the Extradition Act of 187018 not
Court before the Chief Stipendiary Magistrate. The United States Government pro-
duced evidence that on the night of March 30, 1985, Soering killed Derek and Nancy
Haysom, the parents of Soering's girlfriend. Evidence was given of Soering's own
admissions as recorded in the affidavit of the Bedford County police investigator.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. On behalf of Soering, psychiatric evidence
was produced from a forensic psychiatrist that Soering was immature and inexperienced
and had lost his personal identity in a symbiotic relationship with his girlfriend. This
evidence was held irrelevant by the Chief Magistrate. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 21.
'4 Id. On December 30, 1986, the date of Soering's arrest on the murder charges,
Soering was interviewed in prison by a German prosecutor from Bonn. In a sworn
statement, the prosecutor recorded Soering as having said that he never intended to
kill his girlfriend's parents and that there had been no discussion of a plan to kill
them. Id. at 16. On February 11, 1987, a local court in Bonn issued a warrant
for Soering's arrest in respect of the alleged murders. On March 11, 1987, the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany requested Soering's extradition to
the Federal Republic under the Extradition Treaty of 1872 between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. The Director of Public Prosecutions,
the prosecuting attorney in English criminal cases, then advised the Secretary of State
for Home Affairs that the evidence of the German authorities, since it consisted
solely of the admissions made by Soering to the Bonn prosecutor in the absence of
a caution, did not amount to a prima facie case against Soering. Therefore, a magistrate
would not be able to commit Soering to await extradition to the Federal Republic
under the Extradition Act of 1870. On May 20, 1987, the Government of the United
Kingdom informed the Federal Republic that it planned to proceed with the request
for Soering's extradition made by the United States. Id. at 1 16, 19.
'5 Id. at 22.
16 Id. In support of his application for leave to apply for judicial review, Soering
submitted that the assurance received from the United States authorities was so
worthless that no reasonable Secretary of State could regard it as satisfactory under
article IV of the Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United
States. The claim was refused as premature.
17 Id.
18 Under section 11 of the 1870 Act, the Secretary of State has discretion not to
sign a surrender warrant (Atkinson v. United States [1971] Appeal Cases 197). This
discretion may override a decision of the courts that a fugitive should be surrendered,
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to make an order for Soering's surrender to the United States au-
thorities.19 The Secretary of State rejected this request and on August
3, 1988, he signed a warrant which ordered Soering's surrender to
the United States authorities. 20 Soering was transferred to a prison
hospital on August 5, 1988, where he was placed under a special
regime applied to suicide-risk patients. 21 On March 20, 1989, he sub-
mitted a declaration to the European Court of Human Rights22 that
he would not contest an order by the United Kingdom Government
requiring his deportation to the Federal Republic of Germany. 23
Soering filed an application with the European Commission of
Human Rights24 on July 8, 1988,25 based on three submissions. 26 First,
and it is open to every prisoner who has exhausted his remedies by way of application
for habeas corpus to petition the Secretary of State for that purpose. In considering
whether to order the fugitive's surrender, the Secretary of State is bound to take
account of new evidence which has not been before the magistrate. Id. at 34.
19 Id.
20 Id. Soering was not transferred to the United States because of interim measures
indicated by the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights.
See text at infra note 37.
21 Id. Soering produced a psychiatrist's report dated March 16, 1989, which stated
that his dread of extreme physical violence and homosexual abuse from other inmates
on death row in Virginia was having a profound psychiatric effect on him. The report
described a mounting desperation together with objective fears that Soering might
have sought to take his own life.
22 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which entered into force in 1953, established both the European Court
of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights. The number of
judges on the Court corresponds to the number of states parties the Council of
Europe (the Council of Europe currently has 23 members). European Convention,
art. 38, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. By ratifying the Con-
vention, a state does not accept the Court's jurisdiction; a special declaration to that
effect is necessary. Id. at art. 46. Only states and the Commission may refer cases
to the Court. Id. at art 52. The Court's judgments are final and binding. Id. at art.
53.
213 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 26. See also supra note
14 and accompanying text.
24 States parties to the Convention are members of the Commission. European
Convention, supra note 22, art. 20. The Commission has jurisdiction to hear interstate
and individual petitions. Its jurisdiction to handle interstate cases is compulsory when
both states have ratified the Convention. Id. at art. 24. Its jurisdiction may be invoked
only if the state, in addition to ratifying the Convention, has made a declaration
accepting the right of the Commission to hear cases brought against it by individuals.
Id. at art. 25. After accepting jurisdiction, the Commission seeks to ascertain the
facts and help the parties involved reach an amicable settlement. If no settlement is
reached, the Commission prepares a report containing its findings of fact and its
opinion on whether the Convention has been violated. Id. at arts. 28-31. This report
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he maintained that notwithstanding the assurance given to the United
Kingdom Government, if he were extradited to the United States,
there was a serious likelihood that he would be sentenced to death
and subjected to the "death row phenomenon." 27 Soering argued that
this phenomenon results from the combination of several factors: the
delays in appeal and review procedures after a death sentence has
been imposed, during which time a prisoner faces increasing tension
and psychological trauma; the violence and sexual abuse to which
death row prisoners are often subjected; and the specter of execution
itself.28 He argued that the cumulative effect of submission to such
conditions would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and
punishment. Thus, Soering maintained that extradition would consti-
tute a violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, which provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.29
Second, Soering maintained that his extradition to the United States
would constitute a violation of article 6, section 3(c) of the Con-
vention.30 Article 6, section 3(c) provides that a criminal defendant
has a right to defend himself in person or through the legal assistance
of his own choosing.3' Free legal assistance is to be provided to an
accused criminal who is indigent when the interests of justice so
require. 32 Soering argued that the absence of unlimited legal aid in
Virginia would prevent him from pursuing all possible appeals.33
Finally, Soering maintained that his extradition to the United States
would result in a breach of article 13 of the Convention.34 This article
provides that everyone whose rights and freedoms are set forth in the
Convention shall have an effective remedy before a national au-
thority. 5 Soering argued that he had no effective remedy under United
Kingdom law in respect of his complaint under article 3.36
is then transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. Within three months of this
transmission the Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Id. at arts. 32(1) and 48.
25 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 76. The application number
was 14038/88.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 105.
28 Id.
29 European Convention, supra note 22, art. 3.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 76.
11 European Convention, supra note 22, art. 6, § 3(c).
32 Id.
33 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 76.
34 Id.
1, See European Convention, supra note 22, art. 13.
36 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 1 76.
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On August 11, 1988, the President of the Commission indicated to
the United Kingdom Government that it was desirable, in the interests
of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings, not to
extradite Soering to the United States until the Commission had an
opportunity to review his application . 7 The Commission produced a
report dated January 19, 1989, which opined that there had been a
breach of article 13,38 but no breach of either article 339 or article 6,
section 3(c). °
The Commission referred Soering's case to the Court on January
25, 1989,11 for determination of whether the facts disclosed a breach
by the United Kingdom of its obligations under articles 3, 6 and 13
of the Convention. 42 A chamber of seven judge 43 was constituted on
January 26, 1989, and relinquished its jurisdiction on the same day
in favor of the plenary court." Oral presentations began on April 24,
1989,'4 and the Court deliberated in private on April 27, 1989, and
on June 26, 1989." Held, the Commission's report confirmed in part
and rejected in part. Extradition of a fugitive criminal by a Convention
member state to a country where the accused criminal faces a sentence
of death and the "death row phenomenon" constitutes a violation
of article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides that no one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
11 Id. at 77.
38 Id. at 1 78. The vote was seven to four.
19 Id. The vote was six to five. The Commission accepted that the average time
spent on death row by convicted murderers in Virginia was between six and eight
years. However, the Commission considered it significant that persons sentenced to
death contributed to this delay by exercising their state and federal rights of appeal.
40 Id. The vote was unanimous (eleven to zero).
" Id. at 1 1. The governments of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic
of Germany also brought Soering's case before the Court on January 30, 1989, and
February 3, 1989, respectively.
42 Id.
41 See European Convention, supra note 22, art. 43. The Court normally hears
cases brought before it in chambers of seven judges. However, Rule 50 of the Court
provides that the Court can hear a case in plenary session if the issues presented are
of sufficiently great importance.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 3. On the same day, the
Court indicated to the Government of the United Kingdom that it would be advisable
not to extradite Soering to the United States until the Court had finished with
Soering's pending case. Id. at 1 4.
41 Id. at 1 6.
Id. at Preamble to Judgment.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which entered into force in 1953, provides
the basis of European human rights law [hereinafter "the Conven-
tion"] .47 The Convention was drafted shortly after the proclamation
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations. 48
A major purpose of the Convention is the collective enforcement of
certain of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration. 49 The
Convention requires member states to "secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms" defined in section 1 of the
Convention.S° While the Convention initially protected only twelve
fundamental human rights and freedoms,5' various protocols to the
41 See European Convention supra note 22. For a succinct historical background
of the Convention see R. BEDDARD, HUmAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE 14-29 (1973) [here-
inafter BEDDARD].
- The General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, as General Assembly Resolution
217(111). The European Convention was done at Rome on November 4, 1950.
49 See European Convention, supra note 22, at Preamble. The Preamble discusses
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as aiming at "securing the universal and
effective recognition and observance of the rights therein declared." It ends with the
statement that the governments of European countries are resolved "to take the first
steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal
Declaration." Id.
Id. at art. 1.
11 See id. at arts. 2-13. Following is a summary of the rights originally protected
by the Convention.
ART. 2.
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided
by law.
ART. 3.
1. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.
ART. 4.
1. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor.
ART. 5.
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
ART. 6.
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
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Convention have expanded the catalog of protected rights.12 The Con-
vention called for the creation of the European Commission of Human
Rights53 and the European Court of Human Rights54 "to ensure the
law.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law.
ART. 7.
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense for any act or
omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal
offense was committed.
ART. 8.
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home, and his correspondence.
ART. 9.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.
ART. 10.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
ART. 11.
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom
of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
ART. 12.
1. Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of
this right.
ART. 13.
1. Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwith-
standing that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity.
52 Protocol No. 1 was adopted in 1954 and provides, for example, that every
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions (art.
1). Free elections by secret ballot at regular intervals are also called for (art. 3).
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. Protocol No.
4 was adopted in 1968 and provides, for example, that everyone lawfully within the
territory of a state shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence (art. 2). Protocol No. 4 to the Convention,
Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 46.
53 For a succinct introduction to the European Commission, see BEDDARD, supra
note 47 at 31-38.
14 For a succinct introduction to the European Court of Human Rights, see id.
at 38-40.
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observance of the engagements undertaken" by the states who are
parties to the Convention."
The Convention provides in article 3 that "no one shall be subjected
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 5 6
This prohibition is in absolute terms regardless of the recipient's
conduct.17 Unlike most of the rights and freedoms protected by the
Convention and protocols, article 3 makes no provision for exceptions58
and there can be no derogation from article 3, even during a public
emergency threatening the life of the nation. 9 The European Court
of Human Rights has decided three cases through which it has at-
tempted to provide an appropriate standard of what constitutes "tor-
ture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." ' 6
The Court attempted to develop a standard for what constitutes
"inhuman or degrading treatment" when it decided the first of these
three cases. 6' In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Ireland referred
its case to the Court in part for determination of whether the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom had violated article 3 of the Con-
vention. 62 The United Kingdom Government had interned and used
various interrogation techniques63 on citizens of Ireland in an effort
11 European Convention, supra note 22, § 2, art. 19.
56 Id. at art. 3.
" See Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at
1 163.
58 Id.
19 Id. citing art. 15 1 2 of the Convention. Art. 15 1 1 provides:
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation
any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obli-
gations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its
other obligations under international law.
European Convention, supra note 22, art. 15, 1.
1o See Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at
11 162-63; Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at 1 29-33; Case of Campbell
and Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982) at 1 26-29.
61 Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. .H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
61 Id. at 12.
63 Id. at 11 92-106. The United Kingdom applied five techniques: (1) wall-standing:
detainees were forced to remain for periods of some hours in a "stress position,"
described by those who underwent it as being "spread-eagled against the wall, with
their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the
feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainly
on the fingers"; (2) hooding: putting a black or navy colored bag over the detainees'
heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation;
(3) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room
where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise; (4) deprivation of sleep: pending
RuSK AWARD
to obtain information on activities of the Irish Republican Army. 64
The Court held that the United Kingdom Government deliberately
applied its interrogation techniques for lengthy periods of time, and
that the techniques caused intense physical and mental suffering and
acute psychiatric disturbances, if not actual bodily injury. 65 Thus, they
fell into the category of inhuman treatment within the meaning of
article 3.66 The Court also held that the techniques were degrading
since the victims felt fear, anguish, and inferiority capable of hu-
miliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or
moral resistance. 67 The Court held that ill-treatment must attain a
minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of article
3 .6 The minimum threshold is relative to the circumstances of each
case, and factors such as the duration of the treatment, its physical
or mental effects, and in some cases the sex, age, and state of health
of the victim are relevant. 69
The second case to come before the Court concerned the standard
for "inhuman or degrading punishment. ' 70 In the Tyrer case, the
Commission referred to the Court a case brought by a resident of
the United Kingdom alleging a violation of article 3 by the United
Kingdom. 7' Anthony Tyrer was a juvenile school boy on the Isle of
Man72 who had received three strokes of a birch rod as punishment
for assaulting a fellow student. 73 The Court held that Tyrer's suffering
their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep; (5) deprivation of food and
drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their detention and pending
interrogations. Id. at 1 96.
Id. at J1 34-57.
Id. at 1 167.
6Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1 162.
69 Id.
70 Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
11 See id. at 11 4-5. Tyrer initiated his case by filing an application against the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with the Commission on
September 21, 1972, under article 25 of the Convention. The court registry filed the
Commission's request to the Court on March 11, 1977, within the period of three
months established in articles 32 and 47. Id. at 2.
72 The Isle of Man is not a part of the United Kingdom; rather, it is a dependency
of the Crown. The Isle of Man maintains its own government, legislature, and courts
as well as its own administrative, fiscal, and legal systems. The Crown is ultimately
responsible for the Government of the Isle of Man and acts in this respect through
the Privy Council on the recommendation of Ministers of the United Kingdom
government in their capacity as Privy Councillors. Id. at 1 13.
7 Id. at 11 9-12. Tyrer was 15 years of age at the time of his offense and
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did not attain a sufficiently high level to be classified as "inhuman"
within the meaning of article 3.74 However, the Court held that Tyrer's
suffering did constitute "degrading punishment." 75 The Court held
that while a criminal conviction might humiliate a person, the relevant
factor for purposes of article 3 is that a person be humiliated by the
execution of a punishment which is imposed on him.76 In order for
a punishment to be "degrading" and in breach of article 3, the
humiliation or debasement must go beyond that which is usually
associated with a conviction. 77 As in the Irish case, 7 8 the Court held
that the assessment is relative and depends on all the circumstances
of a case, particularly the nature and context of the punishment itself
and the manner and method of its execution. 79 'in Tyrer, the Court
found it significant that Tyrer was subjected to the mental anguish
of anticipating the violent nature of the sentence he was to face.80
Like Tyrer, the third case also involved the use of corporal pun-
ishment in the United Kingdom." In the case of Campbell and Cosans,
mothers of juvenile school boys in Scotland filed two separate ap-
plications with the Commission.82 Each mother maintained that the
punishment. He pled guilty on March 7, 1972, to the assault and was sentenced on
the same day to three strokes with a birch stick. Id. at 9. He was sentenced
pursuant to § 56(1) of the Petty Sessions and Summary Jurisdiction Act 1927 (as
amended by § 8 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1960). Section 10 of the Act details
the execution of the sentence and the instrument which is to be used. Id. at 11-
12. A Directive of the Lieutenant-Governor (for the Isle of Man) dated May 30,
1960, specifies how the whipping is to be administered. Id. at 12. Tyrer's whipping
raised, but did not cut, his skin and he was sore for approximately 10 days following
the whipping. Id. at 10.
14 Id. at 29. The Court held that "the suffering occasioned must attain a particular
level before a punishment can be classified as 'inhuman' within the meaning of article
3." The Court did not, however, state what the particular level is.
7I Id. at 35.
76 Id. at 30.
77 Id.
78 See supra note 65.
79 Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978) at 30.
10 Id. at 33. The court noted that there had been an interval of several weeks
between Tyrer's conviction and the execution of his sentence. Moreover, the court
noted there was a significant delay in administering the punishment at the police
station.
1, See Case of Campbell and Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
82 Id. at 8-11, 20-21. At the time of Mrs. Campbell's application to the
Commission (March 30, 1976), her son was attending St. Matthew's Roman Catholic
Primary School in Bishopbriggs in the Strathclyde Region Education Authority. The
school used corporal punishment as a means of disciplining its students, although it
was disputed whether such punishment was applied to students of her son's age. The
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use of corporal punishment as a means of discipline in her child's
school constituted treatment contrary to article 3.83 No form of cor-
poral punishment was ever administered to either son.14 While the
Court held that a mere threat of conduct prohibited by article 3 might
constitute a violation of that provision,85 the Court held that the
mothers had not established a breach of article 3.86 The Court affirmed
the holding in the Irish case87 that treatment will not be held "de-
grading" unless the person concerned has undergone humiliation or
debasement-either in the eyes of others or in his own eyes-which
attains a minimum level of severity. 88
Although the European Court of Human Rights has held certain
forms of punishment and treatment to be "inhuman or degrading," 8 9
the Convention expressly permits the death penalty, and it is not per
se contrary to article 3.90 Article 2, section 1 provides that no one
shall be deprived of his life except in the case of a sentence by a
court following conviction of a crime which provides by law for the
death penalty. 9' Protocol No. 6 to the Convention provides for the
abolition of the death penalty in times of peace. 92 Protocol No. 6
was opened for signature in April 1983 and entered into force in
local school authority refused to guarantee Mrs. Campbell that her son would not
be subjected to such punishment. Id. at 1 9. Mrs. Cosans' son attended Beath Senior
High School in Cowdenbeath in the Fife Region Education Authority. He was
informed on September 23, 1976, that he was to receive corporal punishment the
next day for having tried to take a prohibited shortcut on his return home from
school. Mrs. Cosans' son was suspended from school because, while he reported for
the punishment, he refused to accept it. He never returned to school because his
parents refused to comply with the condition that if he returned to school he would
comply with "the rules, regulations or disciplinary requirements of the school." Id.
at I 11.
83 Id. at 1 20.
84 Id. at 11 9 and 11.
11 Id. at 26. The threat would need to be sufficiently real and immediate. "Thus,
to threaten an individual with torture might in some circumstances constitute at least
'inhuman treatment'." Id.
86 Id. at 1 31.
87 See supra note 61.
11 Case of Campbell and Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982) at 1 28. This
level must be assessed in light of the circumstances of an individual case.
89 See supra note 57.
90 See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 101.
91 See European Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2, § 1.
92 See Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 1983 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HuM.
RTS. (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) 1.
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March 1985. 91 To date, thirteen states parties to the Convention have
ratified the protocol; however, the United Kingdom has not ratified
the protocol. 94
III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT
In Soering, the European Court of Human Rights addressed for
the first time whether extradition of an indicted criminal by a Con-
vention member state to a country where the criminal faces the death
penalty and a potentially lengthy delay on death row constitutes a
breach of article 3 of the Convention prohibiting "torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." 95 The Court first determined
that article 3 of the Convention can apply to extradition cases.9 The
Court then held unanimously that in light of the particular circum-
stances of the instant case, if Soering were extradited to the United
States, a violation of article 3 would result.
97
The Court first held that article 3 of the Convention can apply
against an extraditing state when adverse consequences are or may be
suffered by an extradited person as a result of treatment or punishment
administered in the receiving state. 98 The Court noted the territorial
nature of the Convention" and the absence of a specific provision
relating to extradition.'0° However, the Court held that these consid-
erations could not absolve member states from responsibility under
article 3 for any foreseeable consequences of extradition suffered by
93 See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 102. Protocol No. 6
entered into force on March 1, 1985 after Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, Spain,
and Sweden ratified it. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INFO. BULL. ON LEGAL AcTrVITEs
22 (Feb. 1986).
94 See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 102.
91 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 1.
- Id. at 11 81-91.
97 Id. at I 111. See also the text following 1 128.
98 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 1 91.
99 Id. at 1 86. The Court noted that article 1 of the Convention provides that
members "shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section 1." This article was recognized as establishing a territorial limit
on the reach of the Convention. The Court also noted that "the Convention does
not govern the actions of States not Parties to it, nor does it purport to be a means
of requiring the Contracting State to impose Convention standards on other States."
l00 Id. The Court noted that the United Kingdom Government referred to other
international agreements which expressly addressed the consequences of extraditing
one person to another jurisdiction. These are the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees (art. 33); the 1957 European Convention (art. 11);
and the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (art. 3).
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a person outside the state's jurisdiction. 101 The Court held that member
states must recognize the Convention as a treaty for the collective
enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms so that the
Convention's safeguards are made practical and effective. 102 The Court
reasoned that in light of the absolute prohibition of torture and of
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment imposed by article
3,103 extradition would be contrary to the spirit and intendment of
article 3 when the extradited fugitive would confront a real risk of
exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.l04 Finally,
the Court held that any liability under the Convention that might
result from extradition in breach of article 3 would be incurred by
the extraditing Convention member state, not by the receiving state,
since the member state took action which exposed an individual to
proscribed ill-treatment. 105
The Court held that if Soering were extradited to the United States,
he faced a real risk of exposure to treatment or punishment contrary
to article 3.106 The Court first noted that Soering would face a real
risk of a death sentence and hence of exposure to the "death row
phenomenon.' ' 107 The Court rejected four arguments of the United
Kingdom Government that Soering did not face a sufficiently real
risk of a death sentence to invoke article 3.10s The Court relied heavily
10, Id. at 86.
102 Id. at 1 87.
,01 See supra notes 56-59.
104 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 1 88.
I0o d. at 1 91.
106 Id. at 11 93-111.
107 Id. at 11 98-99. For discussion of the "death row phenomenon," see supra note
27 and accompanying text.
101 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 11 93-99. The arguments
were: (1) Soering had not acknowledged his guilt of capital murder, as evidenced by
Soering's interview with the German prosecutor; (2) only a prima facie case had so
far been made against Soering. The United Kingdom viewed the psychiatric report
(dated December 15, 1986) as equivocal. The report could be interpreted to mean
that Soering was suffering from a mental disease sufficient to amount to an insanity
defense under Virginia law; (3) even if Soering were convicted of capital murder, it
could not be assumed that he would be sentenced to death. A death sentence must
be recommended by a jury and confirmed by a judge (or in the alternative, merely
given by a judge) and upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court. The United Kingdom
argued that mitigating circumstances such as Soering's age and mental condition at
the time of the offense and lack of a criminal record would need to be taken into
account if Soering were sentenced; (4) finally, the assurance received by the Bedford
County District Attorney would reduce the risk of a death sentence being given or
executed.
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on two statements in concluding that Soering faced a real risk of a
death sentence were he to be extradited to the United States: the
statement by the Bedford County District Attorney that he planned
to seek the death penalty because, in his opinion, the evidence sup-
ported such action,' °9 and the statement by the Attorney General for
the United Kingdom that Soering faced a "more than merely negli-
gible" risk that the death penalty would be imposed." 0
The Court then examined its case law on article 3 and held that,
in the particular circumstances of the instant case, Soering's exposure
to the "death row phenomenon" would constitute such serious treat-
ment that his extradition would be a violation of article 3."' The
Court cited its judgments in the Irish"2 and Tyrer"3 cases for the
propositions that ill-treatment, including punishment, must attain a
minimum level of severity in order to come within the meaning of
article 3114 and that the assessment of this minimum depends on all
the circumstances of a case." 5 The Court held it must take account
not only of physical pain experienced but also of a sentenced person's
mental anguish in anticipating the violence to be inflicted upon him
when there is considerable delay in the execution of the punishment." 6
The Court examined the particular circumstances of Soering's case," 7
and held that the United Kingdom's decision to extradite Soering to
the United States would result in a breach of article 3.11s
,09 Id. at 1 98.
110 Id. See also 93.
Id. at 111.
112 See supra note 57.
" 3 See supra note 70.
11 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 100.
115 Id.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 11 105-10. The Court examined four circumstances: (1) the length of
detention prior to execution: the court concluded that the length of time a condemned
prisoner can expect to spend on death row in Virginia before being executed is six
to eight years; (2) the conditions on death row: the Court noted that while a special
regime for the care of death row prisoners might be "justifiable in principle, the
severity of a special regime such as that operated on death row in Mecklenburg
[Correctional Center] is compounded by the fact of inmates being subject to it for
a protracted period lasting on average six to eight years"; (3) Soering's age and
mental state: the court noted that at the time of the killings, Soering was only 18
years of age and that there was some psychiatric evidence that he was suffering from
an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired the mental responsibility for
his acts; (4) the possibility of Soering's extradition to the Federal Republic of Germany:
the Court noted that Soering's extradition to Germany would "remove the danger
of a fugitive criminal going unpunished as well as the risk of intense and protracted
suffering on death row."




The European Court of Human Rights decided Soering in a manner
consistent with the Court's precedent" 9 and the ideals underlying the
European system for the protection of human rights. 20 However, since
the Court could not point to an actual violation of article 3, the
Court should not have obstructed the extradition. The Court's decision
did not place sufficient emphasis on the principles underlying the
international extradition of fugitive criminals.' 2' In this regard, the
Court failed to recognize United States extradition policy 22 and recent
efforts by the United States in bringing fugitive criminals to justice. 23
If the Court had held that the United Kingdom's extradition of Soering
to the United States would not result in a violation of article 3, the
Court would have promoted international cooperation in bringing
fugitive criminals to justice. Further, the Court would have recognized
the territorial scope of its purpose and its jurisdiction. Instead, the
Court unnecessarily passed judgment on the Virginia criminal justice
system.
While the Court's reasoning in Soering is consistent with the rea-
soning in prior cases, 24 the decision is remarkable because no violation
of article 3 had yet occurred. The three previous cases concerning
article 3. The Court also held that there would be no breach of article 6, § 3(c) if
Soering were to be extradited to the United States. Id. at 112-13. The Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the complaints under article 6 §§ 1 and 3(d). Id. at
117. There was no violation of article 13. Id. at 115-16.
"9 See infra note 124.
120 See European Convention, supra note 22, Preamble. The Preamble to the
Convention states that a goal of the Council of Europe in establishing a system for
the protection of human rights was to maintain human rights and fundamental
freedoms. It also states that the Convention was one of "the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration"
of Human Rights.
1-1 The principles underlying the international extradition of fugitive criminals are
several: ensuring that fugitive criminals do not go unpunished for their alleged crimes,
discouraging crime throughout the world, and protecting nations from fugitive crim-
inals by eliminating the possibility of safe havens for fugitive criminals. See Case
Comment, Double Criminality and the U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty: Hu Yau-Leung
v. Soscia 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 475, 478 (1982).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 139-50.
123 See infra text accompanying notes 151-54.
124 The Court reiterated several previous holdings: that determination of a violation
of article 3 depends on all the circumstances of a case, (see Ireland Case, supra note
69; Tyrer Case, supra note 79); that the protections of article 3 are absolute (see
supra note 57); and that the views of a particular society cannot justify a violation
of this article. Id.
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article 3 resulted from actions which had already taken place." 5 The
Court's discussion of factors which supposedly made a breach of
article 3 a real probability126 suggest just as strongly that no breach
would have occurred in the event of extradition. Soering had only
been indicted for capital murder. He was not a convict facing the
death penalty who had fled death row. He was yet to confront the
Virginia criminal justice system. 2 7 Thus, Soering was anything but
certain to receive a death sentence and to experience an extended wait
on death row prior to execution.
Furthermore, the Court did not pay sufficient attention to the
observation that a convicted criminal, through his role in creating the
"death row phenomenon," would contribute greatly to a violation of
article 3. The Virginia Supreme Court automatically reviews every
death sentence imposed by a trial court, regardless of the defendant's
plea at trial. 12 The supreme court reviews the trial and sentencing
proceedings 129 to determine whether "passion, prejudice or any other
arbitrary factor" contributed to the sentence. 30 A person sentenced
to death can then petition the United States Supreme Court for review
of the Virginia Supreme Court's decision.' That person can then
commence collateral attacks on his conviction through petitions for
25 See supra note 60.
126 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 93-99.
27 Soering would have been presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by a jury of his peers. An insanity defense would have been available
as a bar to conviction. Soering would have been sentenced by the same jury or the
judge alone at a separate hearing in which almost unlimited evidence on four of the
five statutory mitigating factors could have been presented. The Bedford County
District Attorney had assured the United Kingdom that were Soering convicted of
murder, a representation that the United Kingdom opposed the death penalty would
be made to the judge. Further, the Virginia Supreme Court automatically reviews
every death sentence regardless of a defendant's plea at trial. The Virginia constitution
gives the state governor an unrestricted power "to commute capital punishment."
See id. at 11 39-60.
'2 Id. at 1 52. Precedence is given to review of capital punishment cases before
any other case. Normally, state supreme court review will take place within six months
of sentencing. In the absence of subsequent appeals, execution will then take place.
129 The procedures for determining guilt and sentencing are separate in Virginia.
When guilt has been determined, the same jury, or a judge sitting without a jury
will hear evidence regarding punishment. The prosecution must prove beyond a
- reasonable doubt the existence of at least two statutory aggravating circumstances-
future dangerousness or vileness-before the sentencer may impose a death sentence.
Id. at 1 42.
,30 Id. at 1 52.
"I Id. at 1 53.
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habeas corpus in both state and federal courts. 3 2 However, in light
of the procedure which a trial court must follow before it can impose
a death sentence'33 and the availability of review by state and federal
supreme courts, there is little likelihood that a court will reverse a
death sentence during subsequent petitions for habeas corpus. It is
understandable, and perhaps a facet of human nature, that a person
sentenced to death will want to exhaust all avenues of appeal. However,
in most cases, once a death sentence has been affirmed, subsequent
attempts to reverse the sentence only delay the inevitable.'3 Thus, the
defendant himself plays the major role in the "death row phenom-
enon" and his participation must be considered as a factor.
Since the Court could not point to an actual violation of article 3,
the Court should not have obstructed Soering's extradition to the
United States. Instead, the Court should have promoted the purposes
of international extradition of fugitive criminals. The main purpose
of extradition is to bring a fugitive criminal to justice where he allegedly
committed a crime.'35 Extradition thereby removes the incentive for
a criminal to flee to another country, and it helps to protect the
extraditing country from dangerous criminals. 36 Since Soering was
accused of committing a crime in Virginia, he should have been
returned to Virginia to confront its criminal justice system. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has held that Virginia's statutory death penalty
procedure is constitutional and secures against imposition of a death
sentence in an arbitrary or capricious manner.' 37 The court has also
132 Id. The convicted person may petition either the sentencing court or the Virginia
Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The sentenced person may then apply
to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review of the state court's habeas
corpus decision. The person can then file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the federal district court. The district court's decision is subject to review by a United
States circuit court of appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
,33 See supra note 129.
,14 The court noted that since 1977, the year that capital punishment was reinstituted
in Virginia, eight persons have been sentenced to death. In only one case did the
Virginia Supreme Court reduce a death sentence to life imprisonment. Soering Case,
161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 52. Further, the court noted that since 1977
the governor of Virginia has never commuted a death sentence. Id. at 60.
131 See supra note 121.
16 Id.
137 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 48. See Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979);
Turnver v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1984); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238 (4th
Cir. 1984).
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held that the death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment nor does a wait on death row constitute needless emotional
suffering.' Whether or not the European Court agrees with the values
of the Virginia criminal justice system, the people in Virginia have
chosen it and the state's courts have upheld it. Since the European
Court could not demonstrate that a violation of article 3 was more
likely than not to occur, it should have promoted, not frustrated, the
purposes underlying extradition.
Permitting Soering's extradition also would have been more in the
spirit of recent amendments to the extradition treaty between the
United States and the United Kingdom. The 1972 extradition treaty,
like most extradition treaties to which the United States is a party,
recognizes the "political offense" exception to extradition.3 9 The
political offense exception in essence permits a state to refuse extra-
dition of an alleged criminal if the extraditing state believes that the
person to be extradited has committed a "political" offense. A political
offense generally is regarded as an act of aggression directed against
a state or its actors, as opposed to civilians, in an attempt to change
the political status quo of a state. 40 The two countries amended the
treaty in 1985 largely in response to three United States court decisions
which barred extradition of suspected Provisional Irish Republican
Army members to the United Kingdom. All three cases recognized
the defendants' "political offense" defenses.' 4'
The supplementary treaty 42 provides that United States judges can
no longer decide that a fugitive's alleged criminal acts constitute a
138 Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 48. See Stamper v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972
(1980).
139 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468, art. 5.
140 Generally, however, there has not been an international consensus on what
constitutes a "political" offense. See generally I.A. S-EARER, ExTRADITION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 166-93 (1971); M. BAsioUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 368-429 (1974); Annotation, What is a "Political Offense"
or "Offense of Political Character" within Customary Law or Specific Treaty Ex-
emption Barring International Extradition from United States of Persons Charged
with Political Offenses, 61 A.L.R. FED. 786 (1983).
141 In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed,
668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In
re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
142 Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom,
S. ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1985) [hereinafter "Supplementary
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political offense and therefore prevent the fugitive's extradition. All
fugitives accused of committing violent acts are now subject to ex-
tradition even if their acts had political motivations. 43 The supple-
mentary treaty was an effort on behalf of the United States to prevent
it from becoming a safe haven for alleged Provisional Irish Republican
Army terrorists. The Court's opinion does not indicate an awareness
of or a concern for possible future reluctance on the part of the
United States to extradite alleged criminals to the United Kingdom.
Moreover, since the United States has extradition treaties with most
of the other member states of the Council of Europe, an analysis of
how a court in the United States would have addressed a similar
extradition request should have been a relevant consideration in the
Court's decision. The United States has determined that neither the
Federal Rules of Evidence'" nor the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 145 apply to international extradition cases. Commentators
have argued that this policy represents a decision by the United States
not to thwart bringing fugitive criminals to justice by applying the
United States' concept of justice.'" Similarly, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that extradition hearings should have a narrow
scope.147 The only question for initial determination by a magistrate
is "whether the evidence for the [extraditing] state makes a prima
Treaty"]. Criticism of the treaty amendments has been widespread. See, e.g., Com-
ment, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception under
the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 1515 (1988). See also Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception"
Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K. - A Choice between Friendly
Cooperation among Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DEN. J. INT'L LAW &
POLICY 255 (1987); Hannay, An Analysis of the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 21 INT'L LAW 925 (1987).
"I Supplementary Treaty, supra note 142, at art. 1. The Supplementary Treaty
does, however, allow a court to deny extradition if the court finds that a preponderance
of the evidence suggests that the alleged criminal would not have access to a fair
trial in the country to which he or she is extradited. Id. at art. 3.
44 FED. R. Evm. ll01(d)(3) (1979).
141 FED. R. CuM. P. 54(b)(5) (1972).
'46 See Case Comment, The Political Offense Exception in United States Extradition
Law: Eain v. Wilkes, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 428, 431 (1982). The author states,
"[This] permits a requesting State to try its fugitive criminals, without United States
courts applying the more exacting standards of evidence and procedure which exist
domestically." See also Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76
GEO. L.J. 1441, 1444 (1988) (because the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal
Procedure are not applicable to extradition proceedings, the proceedings often are
lavish in their use of hearsay and tolerant of documents of questionable authenticity).
'41 See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1912). See also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S.
309 (1922).
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facie case of guilt sufficient to make it proper to hold the party for
trial."' 48 An accused defendant may neither submit rebuttal evidence
nor may he or she submit defenses which would be admissible at his
or her trial. 149 Thus, the United States has attempted to promote a
policy of returning fugitive criminals to where crimes allegedly have
been committed. 50
In a similar vein, the Court also failed to recognize other recent
efforts by the United States to bring international fugitives to justice.
In 1985, the United States cooperated with Israel and Yugoslavia in
notable efforts to bring alleged Nazi war criminals to justice. Federal
courts in Ohio and California ordered the extradition of John
Demjanjuk5 and Andrija Artukovic.5 2 The Demjanjuk case was sig-
nificant because the court recognized Israel's assertion of extraterri-
torial criminal jurisdiction on the basis of the universality principle.'53
Demjanjuk was ordered extradited because allegedly he had committed
crimes in Nazi Poland more than forty years earlier. The Artukovic
case was significant because the United States had blocked his extra-
dition in 1959 on the basis of a "political offense" defense. In 1985,
however, a similar defense failed, and the court rejected Artukovic's
arguments of res judicata and violation of due process. 54 Both cases
demonstrate that the United States respects the integrity of the criminal
justice systems in other nations, and as a matter of policy seeks to
help bring international fugitive criminals to justice. Given the inherent
cooperative nature of international extradition and the virtual certainty
that the United States' assistance will be sought in future extradition
cases, the Court should have considered how a court in the United
141 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461.
49 Id. at 462.
150 See also, e.g., L.A. Times, May 6, 1988, part 1, at 2, col. 6. United States
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor refused to stay the extradition of a
former Argentine general facing expulsion from the United States on charges that
he had murdered 39 political prisoners in Argentina. Justice O'Connor's decision,
without comment, affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision not to issue
a temporary stay of his extradition.
-5' See In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985). See also Demjanjuk
v. Petrovsky, 612 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Extradition of John Demjanjuk, 603 F.
Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 762 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1985).
152 See In re Artukovic, 628 F. Supp 1370, aff'd, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
, See Moeller, United States Treatment of Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Inter-
national Law, Immigration Law, and the Need for International Cooperation, 25
VA. J. INT'L LAW 793, 862 (1985).
11 Id. at 865.
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States might have addressed a similar request for extradition.
The decision in Soering would have been more defensible had there
been an actual violation of human rights or if the decision had come
from a superior international tribunal155 such as the International Court
of Justice. The European Court of Human Rights was designed to
be the final arbiter of human rights issues for the states which are
parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, in
Soering, the Court passed judgment on a potential human rights
violation in a state not a party to the European Convention. 5 6 The
Court apparently was not willing to accept that different cultures have
different concepts of criminal justice and criminal procedure. By
blocking the extradition of Soering to the United States,'" the Court
effectively imposed its cultural views on another sovereign state. While
Soering did involve human rights, and some commentators argue that
fundamental human rights are not culturally relative," 8 the Court
could not point to an actual violation of article 3. Since there had
not yet been a violation of article 3, the Court should have promoted
the purposes of extradition and recognized the regional nature of its
function. The Court was not the proper forum for decision of a case
of first instance concerning issues on which there is as yet no inter-
national consensus.
Other recent international extradition cases have not followed the
reasoning in Soering.5 9 In October 1989, the Canadian Government
"I By this I mean a tribunal designed to hear and decide disputes between states
and/or international organizations. The European Court of Human Rights was not,
per se, created for this purpose. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
"I For a discussion of the role of the judicial ideology, both restraint and activism,
and its impact on European human rights law as developed by the European Court
of Human Rights, see J.G. MERuuLLS, Tr DEVELOPMENT OF INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGrrs 206-30 (1988). The author suggests
that the Court has adopted an approach of activism guided by "benevolent liberalism."
I 7 The Court's judgment did not prevent the United Kingdom from extraditing
Soering to the United States. As the Court pointed out, the United Kingdom could
still extradite Soering to the United States without assurances that Soering would not
be executed if convicted of capital murder. However, the United Kingdom's action
in extraditing Soering would constitute a violation of article 3 of the Convention.
See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) at 91.
"I See Teson, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT'L
LAW 869, 874 (1985). The author argues that international human rights law has a
substantive core which results from international human rights treaties (regional and
universal) and diplomatic practice. He argues that the core consists, inter alia, of
the following rights: to life, to physical integrity, to a fair trial, freedom of thought,
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of association.
"I But see In re Mahmoud El-Abed Atta, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (The
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ordered the extradition of a former United States marine to California
where he allegedly took part in the worst mass murder case in that
state's history. 160 The extradition treaty between the United States and
Canada 161 permits either government to refuse to return suspects unless
that country receives a guarantee that the death penalty will not be
imposed. However, the Canadian Justice Minister stated that Canada
"had confidence in the American justice system" and added that the
government did not want Canada to become a refuge for United States
criminals. 162 Similarly, Japan recently agreed to extradite to China a
Chinese national who had hijacked a plane enroute from Beijing to
New York City and forced it to land in Japan. 63 Extradition was
ordered, even though the defendant stated that he hijacked the plane
after becoming disillusioned with events in China following the gov-
ernment crackdown on the pro-democracy movement. 164 Contrary to
the reasoning in Soering, both cases demonstrate the willingness of
one government to respect the criminal justice system of another
country.
The Soering decision is quite significant, however, because decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights are final and no appeal is
available.165 Since the inception of the Court in 1959, no state party
to the Council of Europe has failed to give effect to a judgment of
the Court.' 6  The judgment was effective in preventing Virginia from
extraditing unconditionally Soering from the United Kingdom. The
United Kingdom observed the Court's judgment, and agreed to ex-
tradite Soering to Virginia only upon agreement through diplomatic
Soering case "reflects a persuasive though non-binding international standard," 'par-
ticularly on the issue of whether an extraditing state should refuse to extradite an
alleged criminal because of anticipated ill-treatment in the receiving state).
160 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, § A, at 13, col. 1.
161 Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Canada. Dec. 3, 1971,
United States-Canada, 27 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. No. 8237 (Mar. 22, 1976).
162 See supra note 160. The defendant, Charles Ng, stated through his attorneys
that he would appeal the decision of the Justice Minister through the Canadian
judicial system. Id.
161 See Rueters (BC Cycle), Jan. 11, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
,64 Id. Human rights activists supported the hijacker, Zhang Zhenhai, in his request
for political refuge in Japan. Zhang based his request on customary international
law which recognizes the "political offense" exception to extradition. The Chinese
Government, however, maintained that Zhang had been arrested for embezzlement
and fled China just before his trial was to begin. Id.
,63 The principle of res judicata is binding only on the parties to a case. See J.E.S.
FAWCETT, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 395
n.l (2d ed. 1987).
166 See T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (1985).
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channels that the death penalty would not be sought. 67 The decision
has now effectively created a refuge for fugitive criminals who face
a death sentence in the United States. 16 After Soering, a criminal can
now reduce his or her death sentence to life imprisonment simply by
traveling to a member state of the Council of Europe. This aspect
of the case may present problems in the future for the United States
and the states which are parties to the Council of Europe.
169
V. CONCLUSION
The European Court of Human Rights delivered a landmark judg-
ment in the Soering case. The case presented a novel issue which
called for careful balancing of personal and international legal inter-
ests. One sovereign nation requested another to honor its treaty ob-
ligation to extradite an individual accused of brutally murdering two
16' See United Press Int'l, Jan. 15, 1990 (NEXIS, Omni file).
16 Soering and Ms. Haysom apparently did not leave the United States for the
United Kingdom until they learned that they were prime suspects in the investigation
of the Haysom murders. See United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Jan. 13, 1990 (NEXIS,
Omni file). See also Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1441 n.2 (1988) (the number of extradition requests handled by the Department
of Justice increased from 239 in 1983 to 489 in 1985); Sanders, Bringing Them Back
to Justice: Extradition Can Be a Breeze-or a Byzantine Process, TIE, May 1, 1989,
at 42 (the United States Government was currently involved in more than 1,000
extradition cases around the world). But see I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 2-3 (1971). The author suggests that extradition to and from geo-
graphically remote countries is infrequent compared to extradition between countries
with contiguous borders. The author further suggests that a criminal would sooner
try to avoid the consequences of his crime through evasion or protest than flee his
country. [This work was written at a time when international plane fares were
considerably more expensive than they are today.]
169 For example, a former Los Angeles-based United States Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agent indicated in October, 1989 that he might appeal to the European
Court of Human Rights any attempt by the United States to extradite him from
Luxembourg. See Soble, Ex-DEA Agents Hopes to Block His Extradition, L.A.
Times, Oct. 6, 1989, Metro § (part 2), at 1, col. 6. Darnell Garcia became a fugitive
after he learned that, at the conclusion of a DEA corruption investigation, he, and
two other former DEA agents, was suspected of conspiring to traffic cocaine and
heroin and launder profits through banks in Switzerland and Luxembourg. The United
States wanted to extradite Garcia from Luxembourg upon the conclusion of his six
month prison sentence on January 3, 1990, for entering Luxembourg on a false
Mexican passport. Attorneys for Garcia, who is black and Puerto Rican, suggested
that they would base a claim on an alleged series of "discriminatory actions" by the
DEA against Garcia. While it was not clear that Garcia might face the death penalty
if extradited, his case represents a new consciousness of the European Court of
Human Rights and a desire to use the Court in efforts to avoid extradition to the
United States.
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innocent persons. Extradition, however, might have resulted in a
violation of human rights. The Court held that the protection of
human rights is a sufficiently fundamental objective that warrants
frustrating the purposes underlying international extradition.
The Soering judgment may have been a political statement to the
United States and other countries that the European Court of Human
Rights fundamentally opposes the death penalty. Thus, it will refuse
to assist countries who seek to execute their convicted criminals. While
the European system for the protection of human rights is arguably
the most advanced system now operating, the system was designed
to be regional in its function. The Soering judgment essentially was
an attempt to expand extraterritorially the operation of the European
human rights system. As a result, it is now unlikely that an indicted
fugitive criminal who might face a death sentence and a lengthy wait
on death row will in the future be extradited to the United States by
a state party to the Council of Europe.
Other recent prominent international extradition cases have not
followed the reasoning in Soering. It is uncertain whether United
States cooperation in extradition requests by states parties to the
Council of Europe will be adversely affected by Soering. Similarly,
it is uncertain whether states parties to the Council of Europe will in
the future become refuges for criminals who would face a death
sentence in the United States.
David L. Gappa
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